Most successful firms have an abundance of new and old knowledge in their research and development laboratories, and only a fraction is being put into use in new product development. This knowledge is left over from projects that have been killed at different development stages and may actually carry considerable value. In this article, we propose a knowledge bank as a possible solution to preserve and possibly grow this knowledge. It is a selfsustaining institute with minimal or no ongoing effort from the donor company, yet manages the knowledge in a way that protects propri etary interests and actively fosters communi cation and interchange among sponsoring com panies wherever possible. The framework of this structure, as well as how it works, is described here. Specifically, a system dynamics modeling of the knowledge bank is developed, and a sim ulation study is conducted using VENSIM®. The results confirm the viability of creating such a system in a consortium of organizations.
any examples of dormant or abandoned projects can be found in the research and development (R&D) laboratories of incumbent corporations. These corporations are in a race of developing and launching a steady stream of new products hoping to satisfy their loyal customers and attract new customers in potential new markets. An idea-to-launch process such as a stage-gate process guides the product managers in terms of deciding which product-development projects have merit to be investigated further and which ones to kill (Cooper, 1985) . The process consists of stages and gates. At the stages, a set of activities is per formed to develop the product concept further, and the gates are structured as decision points where the gatekeeper, typically the sponsor or product manager, evaluates the performance of the project to date and makes a go/kill decision. This evaluation can be done on the basis of a ranking rec ommended by Linton and Walsh (2004) , or on the basis of R&D performance indices developed by Osawa and Yamasaki (2005) . Many product-development projects are typically terminated at different gates throughout the process, and resources are reallocated to more promising projects. After starting with numerous product concepts, only a few survive to reach the later develop ment stages, and only one may be introduced to the markets.
But what happens to the abandoned or "killed" projects at these various gates? Depending upon when they are terminated, they might carry consid erable value. Many companies, however, consider these efforts as sunk or stranded costs and walk away, although years later there could be renewed interest, resulting in an effort to resume them. This article addresses the defi ciencies in current corporate R&D practices to salvage these projects, and offers a possible solution to knowledge loss in the form of what we call a knowledge bank.
Dormant Projects
Dormant projects are defined as those projects that have extended breaks due to events such as funding lapses, market readiness, temporary loss of interest, external factors such as wars, or perhaps availability of supporting or ancillary technologies (Tukel, Rom, & Kremic, 2007) .
These projects do not go through typical project life cycles, and at the time of termination, there is usually no clear indication of when or if they will ever be restarted. In a stage-gate context, the company's interest is to limit any additional investment in these projects. Thus, very limited, if any, use is made of knowledge management and retention tools, such as close-out doc uments. The accumulated loss of knowledge is substantial since, over the years, the vast majority of new product-development projects initiated will not be completed. Although some corporations seek patents for some of the efforts put into the development as a way to recoup some of the value of their investment, early terminations might prevent this (Elmquist & Masson, 2009) .
The product/technology develop ment effort for dormant projects is shown in Figure 1 . This figure depicts the well-known S-curve theory showing the pattern of project progress. Both the empirical and theoretical research that has appeared in the literature in the last 30 years show that most new productdevelopment efforts follow an S-curvethat is, slow-rapid-slow progress (see, for example, Foster, 1986; Henderson, 1988; Sahal, 1981) . The y-axis specifies the magnitude of improvement in the devel opment of a product for a given period of time in the project timeline. At the early stages, the rate of progress is rela tively slow since much of the technolog ical knowledge is unknown. There is an exponential growth of product/technol ogy realization when the project is in full swing (Christensen, 1992) . At this stage, quick response-to-market needs moti vate companies to allocate more re sources to the project. However, when the project terminates immaturely (dor mant period), the level of effort drops sharply and project development comes to a halt. The length of time between the the quality and relevance of the trans ferred knowledge. When the time between the termination of a project and the restart of it is short, the project environment can be quite similar and thus result in a maximum usage of exist ing knowledge. On the other hand, when there are long lapses between project implementations, then changes in the project environment, which include human resources and technology, lead to loss of relevance of the accumulated knowledge and thus causes the restart at a lower level of development, indicating that some level of rework is needed.
Issues When Reinstating Projects
Many of the individuals with tacit knowledge who participated in the early development stages of dormant projects will have either lost the knowl edge due to time lapses or are no longer a part of the project. In other words, the organization will not have the tacit knowl edge when the product-development project is revived, as tacit knowledge remains with the people involved (Koskinen, 2002) .
There would also be significant challenges with retrieving the explicit knowledge. Documents would have been discarded, lost, or inaccessible to those become damaged or destroyed in stor age, depending on the length of time since they were deposited. Perhaps the indexes or search tools designed to help users find information in the docu ments are lost or of such a nature that the documents become useless. Perhaps it may take longer to find the knowledge than to re-create it. Storage media is also a consideration. Information that is stored in electronic format runs the risk that by the time the information is needed, the equipment, software, or know-how to recover it won't exist. Along with the media, the formats change. Databases come and go with the spreadsheets and other software that are required to process the data. So along with having the right equipment, the appropriate versions of the software may also be required.
Another significant challenge exists in determining what type of information/ data will be needed later. Due to the uncertainty of R&D success and fail ures, predicting how and where knowl edge will be used is difficult. Technology revolutions may radically change what may currently seem valuable. For exam ple, the growth of digital technology has had a tremendous impact on various media and entertainment industries, resulting in the obsolescence of much of the knowledge accumulated over a century, such as optical film. Revoluti onary leaps in technology, however, do not occur that often. Thorough fore thought and deliberate knowledge man agement would be expected to offer considerable benefit on project restarts.
Finally, it may be reasonable to assume that organizations are efficient and will not maintain a functional orga nizational structure to support work that no longer exists. The possibility of renewed activity years in the future may not result in a decision to bridge that long gap. The implication, of course, is that there will be no internal group to nurture the skills and knowledge.
The following are two examples of dormant projects. Although they were implemented in relatively different executions of successive starts impacts seeking the knowledge. Documents may industries, they both have similar char acteristics, and their technology devel opment efforts both follow the one we suggested in Figure 1 . It is only since after the 1990s that the big three automobile companies in the United States started producing electric vehicles for mass markets. General Motors developed the EV1 for the California market, although it was subsequently withdrawn. Typically, these organizations retained limited explicit knowledge and none of their tacit knowledge from the 1920s and 1960s when the electrical vehicle devel opment projects were revived.
Development of Electrical
The product-development effort is depicted in Figure 2 . The long dormant period from the early 1910s to the 1960s is the main reason for this technology to almost start from scratch. Obviously, many knowledge management (KM) tools such as repositories and portals were not in existence, and most devel opment efforts were kept in written documents that were lost as car compa nies vanished. Another issue that may have contributed to the lost knowledge was that although the kernel knowledge on electrical vehicles was applicable, by the 1960s electric car manufacturing processes and technology were not. A further challenge was that technology in combustion engine-driven automo biles had continued to improve. This resulted in longer-than-expected devel opment times in electric vehicle tech nology, higher development costs, and thus high sales prices, slower speeds, and shorter trip ranges. In general, this resulted in poorer performance of elec tric vehicles compared with what users of the day expected from their cars.
Development of Nuclear Technology at NASA
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) investment in nuclear technology began in the late 1950s with the initiation of the Rover and the Nuclear Energy for Rocket Vehicle Application (NERVA) programs. These projects were implemented in cooperation with the Atomic Energy Commission. The Rover project was a technology development effort conceived to develop small nuclearpowered rocket engines as possible backups for chemically powered rock ets. Its sister project, NERVA, was for mulated to achieve both ground and flight demonstration of nuclear ther mal-powered rocket engines (Bowles & Arrighi, 2004) .
For approximately 25 years, NASA continued to study and build knowl edge on nuclear-based propulsion and power. Materials were characterized in the radiation environment. Propellant formulation experiments were conduct ed. Engine designs were assessed and tested. During this process, numerous reports were written, processes and procedures were developed, hardware was fabricated, and personnel were trained. By 1973, knowledge on this subject had come a long way. In fact, 20 nuclear thermal propulsion rocket engines had been built and tested. These ranged from relatively small 25 kW engines up to 250-kW devices. The technology was so promising that it was planned as a backup approach to power lunar spacecraft in the event that the primary chemical-propulsion options failed to meet mission requirements.
By the early 1970s, the environment for NASA changed dramatically. The Apollo program, once a well-funded effort clearly in the public eye, began to lose public interest. Missions to the moon, the ability to get there, and the retrieval of specimens ceased to have relevance for many. The high cost of the NASA programs, the resource needs in other areas, and the lack of public interest all combined to cause the U.S. Congress to abruptly end the Apollo program. Without the Apollo program and NASA funds shifting to the development of the space shuttle, there was no obvious near-term demand for nuclear power or propulsion; thus, NERVA and Rover were terminated.
The project remained dormant for approximately 15 years until the start of the space exploration initiative. Nuclear technology was explored for powering 100-kW nuclear electric propulsion thrusters under the so-called SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power) program (Bennett, Hemler, & Schrock, 1996) . This investment abruptly ended in 1993 shortly after the change in pres idential administrations. Investment in nuclear technology lay dormant again, this time for about a decade.
The restart of nuclear technology development in 2003 was also a result of political changes. This program included both technology development as well as a robotic science mission to the icy moons of Jupiter, called the JIMO mission. Nuclear technology was and nuclear technology development was an important aspect of the efforts under this program. For a variety of rea sons, NASA chose to partner with Naval Reactors (NR), which is associated with both the Navy and the U.S. Department of Energy. NR is a research organization that specializes in reactor designs and was given roles in the design of nuclear portions of the JIMO mission. The renewed interest by NASA was to be short-lived. Events with the space shut tle, demands of the International Space Station, and the new vision for space exploration that was announced in 2004 placed increasing demand on the NASA budget to the point that the U.S. $10-to-15-billion JIMO mission was cancelled as well as the nuclear work started at NR. As of 2006, only a few mil lion dollars is budgeted for nuclear technology work and is simply an attempt at sustaining some level of nuclear capability within NASA. The progress of nuclear technology develop ment at NASA is presented in Figure 3 .
Content of Knowledge Banks
A firm can be made up of a variety of differing resources that allow it to com pete within the market (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) . Resources (that is, machinery, capital, etc.) can be either used immediately or stored to provide a future benefit to a firm. A firm's resources can be represented by the knowledge used to produce new products and processes (Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996) . Knowledge resources can also be used immediately or stored to provide a future benefit to a firm. The proposed knowledge bank is an accumulation of these knowledge resources that do not possess a current benefit to the firm but may be of future value.
Knowledge contained within a firm's current and dormant projects represents a stock of stored knowledge. Moorman and Miner (1997) refer to this stock of knowledge as organizational memory. For organizational memory to be useful, it should be in a storable and retrievable format (Huber, 1991) . When organizational memory stocks are retrieved, they have two positive aspects to a firm in its development of products. The first benefit is the ability to remem ber what has worked in the past, and the second benefit is the ability to remember what did not work (Day, 1991) . Both of these qualities of the knowledge bank can allow firms to access the successes and failures of pre vious projects so that what went right and what went wrong can be retained and remembered at a future time.
essential to accomplish this mission, 
Creation of Knowledge Banks
It is clear in the previous examples that the reasons a project goes dormantnamely, lack of funds, lack of current interest, or external environmental factors-imply that minimal resources, desire, and effort will be available inter nally to retain the knowledge and tech nology developed. Given this situation, a feasible method that can be employed by a corporation for salvaging knowl edge requires minimal or no ongoing effort, inherent staying power, and management of knowledge in a way that protects proprietary interests yet actively fosters communication and interchange whenever possible. Staying power in this context refers to the ability of the solution process to sustain its own existence for long peri ods of time relatively independent of external events. Because dormant proj ects will likely be in a dormant state for a long and unknown period of time, one cannot easily estimate how much resources or time will be required to bridge the dormancy gap. Therefore, knowledge-management solutions will need to be unique and independent of the project-and possibly even the organi zation that sponsored the project.
Managing knowledge such that proprietary interests are protected yet open information is actively shared is key to long-term knowledge manage ment for dormant projects. Once again, it must be assumed that the organiza tional resources and structure that support the project cease to exist dur ing the dormant period. Assuming also that valuable and possibly proprietary knowledge exists under the project, one must find a place to store that knowledge or, better yet, a place to grow that knowledge even during dor mancy. The need to foster and grow the knowledge outside of the organi zational boundaries is a common situ ation faced by most organizations, which might motivate them to form consortia or alliances (West & Gallagher, 2006) .
If a project or organization has knowledge that is not needed in the immediate future, it should be stored with an entity that specializes in man aging knowledge-that is, an institute. Ideally, the knowledge will be managed such that more comes out than was ini tially put in. The term knowledge bank (KB) describes an institute that per forms this function. Figure 4 shows Figure 4 : KB framework.
areas such as nanotechnology, media lab oratories, and computing (Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006) . MIT established a media laboratory around 1985, with the inten tion of creating a structure that allows researchers to pursue radical and risky projects that would otherwise not be funded in a typical corporate environ ment (Brand, 1988) . Similarly, the Albany Nanotech Center provides a common place for creating alliances among companies like IBM and Sony to support their R&D work (www.albany nanotech.org).
They suggest an open innovative strategy where knowledge is freely shared across participating organizations. Although there are structural similarities among these and the KB, what makes the KB unique is that the knowledge that is being deposited is not of current interest to the contributing organization; howev er, it might be of interest to the other organizations or become of interest again to the contributing organization at a later point in time. The KB is also different from alliances in that alliances require continuous commitment to the partnership and focus only on active research projects. As presented in Figure 4 , the resources are used as inputs to the valuecreation process. This is the stage where the knowledge creation takes place by harvesting knowledge and technology from different sponsoring companies, or by further developing the concept into its final form. The results of these efforts are considered to be the output of the KB that will be available to spon soring companies and other organiza tions. As a result, the knowledge that had no value to the organization at one point in time is salvaged and improved to become valuable at a later time.
While the KB concept is simple and intuitive, the practical aspects of suc cessfully implementing this concept may be less than trivial. For example, the details of how to capture and deposit the knowledge, how to store it, how to support the process during dormancy, and how to extract the knowledge are not that simple. There are, however, rea sonable approaches that may be consid ered and utilized. These are based on the concepts of minimizing costs, sharing those costs across the broadest set of possible benefactors, and maintaining knowledge-management processes that treat all depositors fairly.
• The prerequisites to become a sponsor ing member: In order for an organiza tion to participate in the KB, there needs to be two underlying business processes in place: (1) an idea-to launch process such as stage-gate, which enables periodic evaluation and documentation of development projects, and (2) a parallel running knowledge-retention process, which captures knowledge as generated dur ing the development stages. Figure 5 shows this system. When projects are terminated prematurely at the gates, the knowledge generated will be sal vaged by transferring it to the KB. (Broring & Leker, 2007 ).
• Intellectual property ownership:
Similar to many other collaborative research centers, such as MIT's Media Lab (Haase, 2000) , the ownership of IP resides with the KB, although the KB is committed to license it to the member organizations. The licensing arrangements should be made on a nonexclusive basis, mean ing that any member organization can gain access, regardless of the ori gin of the knowledge. In a recent study, Aoki and Schiff (2008) suggest the creation of IP clearinghouses as a means of promoting accessibility to licenses and patents. KB can assume such a role as well.
• Resources: The employees of the bank should include researchers, scientists, librarians, and an intellectual property specialist. In addition to full-time employees, employees may be assigned on a rotating basis from the sponsoring companies; they could also include students working as interns and faculty from research uni versities. The employees in general are responsible for adding value to the knowledge made available. Knowledge resources are critical inputs to the value-creation process. The useful ness, completeness, and the readiness of the documentation impact the effort required to store and grow the knowl edge. Knowledge-mining tools would be required in this process. Additional resources in the form of laboratory equipment, computer hardware and software, and digital instruments may also be required to investigate the find ings provided by the sponsors. The allocation of these different types of resources should be done in an aggre gate project planning (APP) framework (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992 (2001) indicate that the critical aspect of knowledge exchange between the partners is the position or role of the partner in that industry. A partner can have dual roles, as a competitor and complementor, which might impact the tacitness, specificity, and complexity of the knowledge being transferred. A partner-resource exchange model can be implemented to improve the partnership.
Universities as Knowledge Banks
There are several possible approaches to capturing and depositing the knowledge into the KB. Institutions that have KM programs are well versed in knowledgecapture practices and could offer these services. Given that this could be a long-term need and relationship, they may have an incentive to subsidize the costs of facilitating the knowledge cap ture. Depending on the nature of the knowledge and university objectives, the university may be interested in picking up some key employees. From the project's and organization's per spective, they may view this as a form of outsourcing and may be willing to transfer some key employees and per haps even agree to share salary costs to ensure full transfer. Universities are in the business of managing knowledge and would be the most efficient at it.
Universities can be unbiased and per haps perform a pooling function for several organizations that may be in similar positions. Since universities are generally not driven by the desire to make and sell tangible commodities, they may be the one place that several competing organizations can come to, jointly sponsor, and expect a fair return on the invested knowledge.
Simulation of Knowledge and Revenue Growth
Knowledge, regardless of where it is generated (either at the organizational level or at the knowledge bank), follows an S-curve growth (Christensen, 1992) . Given the growth rate of knowledge, the amount of knowledge that accumulates is a function of the current level of knowledge and how far it is from its technological limit. We use the follow ing equation to represent this:
where g is the growth rate, K t is the knowledge level at time t, and L is the technological limit. A hypothetical knowledge level being between 1 and 100, with an aggressive growth rate of 0.2, Figure 6 represents the knowledge accu mulation over a 70 time period at the bank. At around time 40, the knowledge level K t is almost at the technological limit, while a smaller value for g would delay reaching the limit to a later period.
The revenue that an organization can receive during the rapid growth of knowledge should also grow rapidly but should slow down and even may decline as the knowledge reaches its technological limit. Thus, the following equation will be used to develop the revenue graph in Figure 7 .
where R t is the revenue at time t and rev_growth is the percentage of revenue rev_increase = 0.16, marav = 0.8, and carryover from the previous period. When the knowledge level gets beyond mrev, a portion of that (rev_increase) leads to additional revenue, while when knowledge gets closer to its limit, larger than marav, there is a decline in rev enue, rev_decrease. The corresponding cumulative profit is given by:
where c i is the cost incurred in period i and p t is the profit at time t. In the equation, we assume that the develop ment cost is linearly related to time. In the revenue figure (Figure 7 ), we used R 1 = 0, rev_growth = 0.95, mrev = 20, rev_decrease = 0.6, and in the profit fig  ure (Figure 8) , we used c i = 50 for all i.
Note that the specific values we used to develop the graphs are chosen arbi trarily, although the functional forms resemble expected patterns. Further more, in the simulation study presented in the next section, rather than treating the parameters as constants, we also introduced randomness into the equa tions. Most organizations have a number of projects that would follow this pattern of evolution, although with different val ues for the parameters. For the projects that are not pursued by organizations internally, the knowledge bank can be used as an outlet to salvage value out of them. The next section shows how. 
System Dynamics Modeling of KB
System Dynamics (SD) is a methodolo gy for studying and managing complex feedback systems, such as one finds in business and in other social structures (Sterman, 2000) . The suggested KB model possesses interactions and feed back mechanisms between the collabo rating organizations and the bank, and thus SD can be used to examine the impact of decisions on the system. As policy decisions are enacted, they can start to change the system itself. Policy decisions must also be revisited at each iteration to access their impact on the system. As a policy decision's impact changes the system, it may no longer be valid and may require adjustment. Figure 9 shows the causal loop diagram for a possible KB.
The diagram consists of two loops that impact the overall model. The first loop is the negative loop that shows cause-and-effect relationships among the KB, resources, and the knowledgecreating firms. As the knowledge bank increases in size, it requires more resources, which has a negative influence on the resources available to transfer the knowl edge from the participating firms. The second loop is the positive loop. As the knowledge bank increases in size, there is more development of the knowledge into Profits + License and Commercialization of Knowledge + Knowledge licenses, which then generates revenue for the participating firms. The revenue also adds to the available resources. The overall system has a balanced polarity. Figure 10 is the stock and flow map of the KB system based on the causal loop diagram. Knowledge flows through the sys tem as follows. The knowledge accumu lated from the terminated projects at each firm is submitted to the KB. At KB, the accumulation rate of knowledge follows the graph in Figure 6 . Some of this knowledge ages and becomes obsolete, and thus will be removed from the KB stock. On the other hand, some of it will become commercially viable in the form of licenses and will create profits. A portion of the profit will stay in the KB system in the form of resources, while some will be returned to the firms.
The Stock and Flow Map of KB

Computational Results
The model described earlier and pre sented in Figure 10 is simulated using VENSIM. VENSIM is a software applica tion that can be used for developing and analyzing dynamic feedback models. Models can be constructed either graphically or in a text editor. There are a number of modeling applications using VENSIM that can be found in the litera ture (see, for example, Eberlein & Peterson, 1992; Garcia, 2006; Morecroft & Sterman, 1994) . We assume that there are three firms and each firm generates knowledge based on a beta distribution. If the knowledge created exceeds a threshold value, the knowledge is avail able to be transferred to the KB. To trans fer knowledge to the KB, resources must be used. The KB has a resource require ment equivalent to the natural log of its size. We further assume that the aging of knowledge results in a 10% reduction in the bank per year. Knowledge transfor mation is assumed to take place only when the knowledge accumulation exceeds a threshold value, which is determined by beta distribution. If a successful KB transformation takes place, there is a four-time period delay before it generates a profit. The profits generated are proportional to the level of the KB transformation. We assume that 70% of profit generated is invested back in the KB system, allowing the rest to accrue to the stakeholders. The equations that control the evolu tion of simulation are given in the Appendix.
Figures 11 to 13 present the results of the study. Figure 11 shows the accu mulation rate of knowledge in the bank over a 120 time period. The y-axis rep resents the level of knowledge, with an initial starting value of 100. Although there is no clear consensus regarding a unit of measurement, some proposed units are lines of code and bytes of data or documentation (Kanevsky & Housel, 1998) . The change in shades in the graphs indicates various confidence lev els. Figure 12 shows the resource accu mulation in the system, and Figure 13 is units) for the stakeholders. The y-axis in Figure 12 represents the aggregation of resources available (refer to Figure 4 ) indicated by a common measure such as monetary value. It is important to note that even though we set the system to require 70% of profits to be invested back in the resources, the KB system can still deliver healthy profits to the stakeholders. This is an encouraging result for consortiums to consider cre ating a knowledge bank.
the profits generated (in monetary 
Conclusions and Future Research
The formation of alliances and innova tion networks to develop, manufacture, and market new products continues to grow (Parise & Henderson, 2001) . Companies form alliances with the intention of accessing capabilities that they lack, to transfer knowledge and technology and expedite the access to markets, among other reasons. IBM's recent effort to make collaborative work by opening up research laboratories to other companies, including possible competitors, has been discussed in the literature (Hamm, 2007) . In general, these major companies believe that suc cess is possible only when you team up with other companies, or even with individual researchers (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006) . What makes the KB concept different from a typical alliance is that in alliances, all parties involved have an interest in pur suing the technology, while in the KB structure, parties do not have interest in pursuing the development of the technology or allocating further resources to that technology. The KB houses and further develops these unwanted technologies without any consideration to the possible commer cialization aspect of it. The KB also dif fers in the sense that it is an independ ent clearinghouse of ideas where the contributor and the acquirer of the knowledge need not have any direct contact.
A new knowledge-management concept is presented here that is aimed at addressing the unique needs of dor mant projects. The concept, termed knowledge bank, is founded on concep tually simple notions that are based on low-cost, efficient, and perpetual self sustainment, as well as unbiased knowledge management. These attri butes of the knowledge bank offer the project organization the best chance of preserving and possibly even growing the respective knowledge. Rather than having periodic setbacks due to dorman cy, the development of the R&D projects continues, partially due to the KB.
Some questions that invite further research include the determination of how to decide what knowledge to cap ture and store. Knowing that in the future some form of the knowledge will be needed, how does one go about deciding which knowledge to capture? It is unlikely that many projects will have the ability to collect most of the explicit knowledge and regain access to some of the tacit knowledge as the NASA reactor decommissioning project had. Of course, there is also much more that could be discussed about capturing the identified knowledge, its storage, its growth, and its eventual dissemination.
There are also other possible ways of implementing the knowledge bank concept. Consortia exist today that, in some cases, serve as think tanks, and perhaps these also may want to develop a focus on long-term knowledge cap ture and retention. These may have the advantage of already having a pooled set of resources and interests that may make it easier to transition into a knowledge-broker role. ■
